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  This paper presents an adverse selection model that contributes to 
explain why women are less likely to be promoted. There are two types of 
workers: family-committed and job-committed workers. The cost of job 
effort during the first period of the working life is higher for the former. 
Firms offer two types of contract, one involving high effort during the 
first period with promotion possibilities and the other requiring low 
effort but with no opportunity for promotion attached. We show that 
women are less likely to apply for jobs with promotion possibilities, but 
when they do, women are just as likely to succeed as men. 
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 31 Introduction
The fact that women are underrepresented in higher level jobs in relation to men
has received a great deal of attention in the literature. The Catalyst Census
reports that in 2008 only 15.2% of the corporate o¢ cers on Fortune 500 were
women. Women ￿nd it particularly di¢ cult to move up the ladder in law ￿rms
and academic institutions. For example, Rhode (2001) ￿nds that "women in the
legal profession remain underrepresented in positions of greater status, in￿ uence
and economic reward. They account for only 15% of federal judges and law ￿rm
partners, 10% of law school deans and 5% of managing partners of large ￿rms"1.
Recently, Goldin and Snowdon (2007) show the di¢ culty that women still ￿nd to
be promoted in academia. These disparities re￿ ect di⁄erences in job promotion
patterns between men and women and help to explain the well documented
gender wage gap (for OECD member countries, the average wage gap was 17%
in 2007)2.
While disparities at the upper levels of many professions are easy to doc-
ument, the reasons behind them remain unclear. There are few papers that
provide theoretical models which account for gender di⁄erences in promotion
patterns. The seminal paper by Lazear and Rosen (1990) pointed out that
fewer women than men are promoted because the ability standard for pro-
motion is higher for women. As women leave the labour market more often
than men, because they have better non-market opportunities at home, ￿rms
￿nd it more di¢ cult to recover the investment in ￿rm training. In order to
compensate this, ￿rms demand higher ability levels from women to promote.
Nonetheless, promoted women gain higher average wages than men because the
average promoted women have higher ability. Milgron and Oster (1987) argue
that employers discriminate against talented Invisibles in promotion. There is
a relative lack of recognition for disadvantaged workers (Invisibles) due to mis-
perceptions or cultural taboos. Invisibles include women. Booth et al. (2003)
presents a model where promotion is based on the acquisition of speci￿c human
capital and women are promoted as men are, but after promotion women may
receive smaller wage increases. Women earn lower wages because (i) external
discrimination: they have worse outside opportunities than men if they leave
the ￿rm; or (ii) internal discrimination: ￿rms may respond di⁄erently to outside
o⁄er threats from women and men due to discrimination.
The model that we present have some di⁄erent implications for gender di⁄er-
ences in promotion rates and wages after promotion to those mentioned above.
More speci￿cally, we propose a model where: (i) women, on average, are pro-
moted less than men; (ii) more women than men occupy jobs without promotion
possibilities; (iii) when women are placed in jobs with promotion possibilities,
their promotion rate is the same as men￿ s; and (iv) the wages after promotion
is the same for men and women. The model formalizes the "dead-end" explana-
tion for gender di⁄erences in promotion: women are promoted less frequently to
higher hierarchical levels, because women are in dead-end jobs that o⁄er fewer
1See this study for references on evidence from the legal profession.
2OECD Employment Outlook, 2008.
2opportunities for promotion (Groot et al. 1996). The reason why women occupy
jobs with less promotion possibilities in our model results from women￿ s choice
between the types of contracts that a ￿rm optimally o⁄ers.
The traits of the model and the main results that we present are loosely
as follows. There are two types of preferences among workers, job-committed
and family-committed preferences. The di⁄erence between them is that the
marginal cost of e⁄ort is higher for family-committed workers during the ￿rst
period of their working life. As a way to capture social norms, it is assumed
that among men there are more job-committed workers than among women.
Following Becker (1985), greater commitment on behalf of women to child care
and housework can a⁄ect the e⁄ort they make on the job. Preferences are
private information, so the employer cannot identify what type the applicant
is. Firms face an adverse selection problem.3 Nonetheless, the di⁄erence in the
cost of e⁄ort only exists during the ￿rst period of a worker￿ s lifetime, that is,
this di⁄erence disappears when child rearing is over and family care requires less
e⁄ort We divide the working life into two periods. In this context, a ￿rm designs
a contract menu that allows these two types of workers to be screened for, by
o⁄ering two types of jobs: one with a chance of promotion that entails a high
level of e⁄ort during the ￿rst period and another without this opportunity, but
requiring a low level of e⁄ort. If the optimal contract under perfect information
where o⁄ered, the types with a lower disutility of e⁄ort will have an incentive
to mimic those who su⁄er a greater disutility, in order to obtain a larger utility.
As in any standard screening model, distortions in e⁄ort are introduced in order
to reduce agents￿informational rents. We introduce the possibility that ￿rms
use promotion incentives to reduce the monetary value of informational rent.
Promotion in our model will imply both monetary and non-monetary re-
wards. Promoted workers will have higher wages than non-promoted workers)
and, as a prize, promotion confers status. As in Besley and Ghatak (2008),
we assume that the value of status is negatively correlated to the proportion
of promoted workers. Status has no value if everybody is promoted. The in-
troduction of status concerns related to promotion is a relevant aspect of our
model (as most papers on promotion do not take into account non-monetary
rewards), which incorporates some ideas of recent papers by Fershtman et al.
(2006) and Besley and Ghatak (2008) who analyze the in￿ uence of status con-
cerns on the e⁄ort made on the job. We will show that the introduction of
promotion incentives yields higher pro￿ts for the ￿rm.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the related literature with
our analysis. Section 3 describes the basic model of adverse selection and the
equilibrium that provides the intuition for the model presented in Section 4.
Section 4 includes the adverse selection problem with promotion incentives and
presents the main results. In section 5, the models with and without promotion
incentives are compared. In section 6, we convert the model￿ s main results into
implications for gender di⁄erences in promotion patterns. Finally, the conclu-
3Landers et al. (1996) present an adverse selection problem in law ￿rms. They show how
criteria for promotion set excessively long hours of work which leads women to record lower
promotion rates.
3sions of this research are presented in the last section.
2 Related literature
This section outlines several strands of the economic literature related to our
analysis.
2.1 Literature on implications of status concerns on e⁄ort
While traditional economics has focused on monetary rewards, sociologists stress
social rewards, including status, as important motivation for human behavior
(Fershtman et al., 2006)4. In our model, ￿rms use promotion incentives to screen
workers, because ￿rms know that some types of workers are status-concerned.
This trait of the model is connected to some recent papers by Fershtman et al.
(2006) and Besley and Ghatak (2008), who introduce status incentives in two
di⁄erent hazard problems in which ￿rms use status as a kind of reward to elicit
e⁄ort on the job5.
As in these two papers, our model considers that the source of social status is
the workplace6. We will consider that a promotion on the job will confer status
to the promoted workers for two reasons. First, they will get higher wages and
workers are concerned about wages in absolute terms, but also in relation to the
other wages within the ￿rm7. Second, promotion is like a medal, prize or award,
which will be worth little if it is obtained by many people. Particularly, the value
of status after promotion is determined by the proportion of promoted workers
(as in Besley and Ghatak, 2008), whenever the wage of promoted workers is
higher than the wage of non-promoted workers (as in Fershtman et al., 2006,
relative wages are important).
4See Weiss and Fershtman (1998) for an excellent survey about the role of social status in
the economic analysis of saving, consumption, wages and economic growth.
5See the introduction of Besley and Ghatak (2008) for references on how organisations
foster e⁄ort using means other than monetary rewards. Fershtman et al. (2006) provide a
clear description of the importance of social concerns and how they a⁄ect the amount of e⁄ort
exerted on the job.
6Social status has been related to di⁄erent elements such as conspicuous consumption,
relative wealth, or an individual￿ s occupation. For instance, Bagwell and Berheim (1992)
assume that relative wealth confers status; in Fersthman and Weiss (1993) status is conferred
by a worker￿ s occupation and it depends on the average wage and on the proportion of quali￿ed
workers in this occupation. Corneo and Jeanne (1998) and Ireland (1998) consider that status
depends on conspicuous consumption. Berheim (1994) assumes that status depends on public
perception about an individual predisposition rather than on individual actions.
7Frank (1985) analyzes the relationship between wages and status within ￿rms. In Cole et
al. (1995) individuals are not only concerned about their level of wealth but also about their
relative wealth.
42.2 Literature on gender di⁄erences in preferences and
gender pay gap
It is important to recall that our results stem from a rational choice made by
men and women according to their preferences8. We assume that more women
than men have family-committed preferences, whereas there are more men with
job-committed preferences. Findings in the ￿elds of psychology, biology and
anthropology suggest that temperamental sex di⁄erences with evolutionary and
neurochemical roots exist and that they may explain the di⁄erences in the utility
function of men and women. Stereotypes considering men to be more compet-
itive, more status-minded and more inclined to take risks than women, and
stereotypes deeming women to be more attached to their children and more
risk-averse than men are true as generalizations9. Browne (1998) outlines the
di⁄erence in family-commitment between men and women based on evolution:
"Likewise, we should not be surprised when we ￿nd mammalian mothers
who are loath to be separated from their helpless young, or at least unwilling
to be separated from them as much as a single-minded commitment to career
might require. It is simply a fact of life, easily understandable in evolutionary
terms, that mothers are more tightly bound to their young children than are
fathers (Rossi, 1977)." (Cited in Browne 1998, p.436).
We can also ￿nd explanation for the di⁄erences in preferences by gender
from neurobiology10. Of course, not all is determined by evolution or biology.
There is a place for culture, social environment, education and the expectations
that an adult has regarding the behavior of boys and girl. For example, Alesina
and Giuliano (2007) con￿rmed the power of the family measured by family
ties in in￿ uencing labor market preferences. Escriche et al (2004) and Escriche
(2007) use a model of cultural transmission of preferences proposed by Bisin
and Verdier (2001) in which children acquire labor market preferences from
their parents and from other adults.
The assumption of our model concerning the di⁄erence in distribution of
preferences among men and women is quite common in the literature. Most
theoretical and empirical papers assume that there is a di⁄erence between men
8A challenge for labour economists is to identify the extent to which observed gender
di⁄erences in labour market outcomes are due to discrimination, or to other unobservable
factors, or to fundamental di⁄erences between men and women. See the survey of Booth
(2006) where the relevant hypotheses are clearly exposed.
9Croson and Gneezy (2008) survey the experimental economics literature that investigates
preferences di⁄erences between women and men. They focus on risk aversion, social prefer-
ences and competitiveness.
10The contact with the baby and chemical changes due to large increases in oxytocin (the
"connection" hormone), generate a motivated, protective and always attentive brain that
requires mothers to change their reactions and priorities in life. In modern society, where
women are not only responsible for child birth, but also economic support for the family, these
changes in the brain creates a deep con￿ict in a mother￿ s life and make the rearing period, a
time when we can observe diversity in women￿ s priorities depending on whether they assign
more importance to career or family life. In maturity, as children grow and menopause comes,
women do not receive the calming oxytocin and they are less inclined to be as attentive to
others needs. See Brizendine (2007) and the reported references for an explanation of all these
neurobiological e⁄ects.
5and women in terms of attitude concerning child care and other family respon-
sibilities. As a result, research assumes quitting rates (Lazear and Rosen, 1990)
or the e⁄ort made on the job (Becker, 1985) are di⁄erent.
2.3 Empirical literature on job promotion
How well do the results of our model ￿t the empirical results? The empirical
literature has provided mixed results. Blau and Devaro (2007) perform a concise
survey in the introduction to their research. Paraphrasing these authors: some
studies that analyze only promotion probabilities have found that promotion
rates are lower for women than for men with similar observed characteristics11,
other studies obtain the reverse12, while other research has found no signi￿cant
gender di⁄erence in promotion rates13. Several studies have considered both
the promotion probabilities and wage increases attached to promotions, which
we consider should be the main reference for the model we will present. The
results of our model state that, overall, women promote less than men but those
women that share characteristics with men (in our model women that hold jobs
with high e⁄ort) have equal promotion opportunities. Women that promote re-
ceive the same wage as men. Empirical evidence should show us that men have
a higher probability of being promoted than women. However, we should also
observe a reduction in the gender disparity in promotion rates if the regressions
control for some factors like characteristics that may condition the choice of a
dead-end job, unobservable heterogeneity or for women￿ s desire to apply for jobs
that o⁄er promotions. Some previous studies coincide with these predictions.
For example, Olson and Becker (1983) found lower promotion rates for women
than for men, but comparable wage increases attached to promotions for the
two groups. McCue (1996), using the 1976-88 survey years of the Michigan
Panel Study of Income Dynamics, found that women are less likely to get pro-
moted but no di⁄erence between wage growth for white men and women upon
promotion is found. Jones and Makepeace (1996), using personnel data from a
large UK ￿nancial company ￿nd that women promote less than men, but much
of the observed di⁄erence is due to their di⁄erences in attributes. Their results
also suggest that men and women receive equal payment once senior grades
have been reached. Blau and Devaro (2007) ￿nd, with a large sample of estab-
lishments from the US Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality employer survey,
that women have lower probabilities of promotion and expected promotion than
men do. However, it is also observed that, as they include job-speci￿c worker
performance ratings in the analysis, allowing us to control for performance and
ability more precisely than through commonly used skill indicators such as ed-
ucational attainment or tenure, standard information on occupation, industry
11Acosta (2005), Cabral et al. (1981), Cannings (1988), Cobb-Clark (2001), McCue (1996),
Olson and Becker (1983), Ransom and Oaxaca (2005) and Spurr (1990).
12Barnett et al. (2000), Gerhart and Milkovich (1989), Hersch and Viscusi (1996), Spilerman
and Petersen (1999) and Stewart and Gudykunst (1982).
13Hartmann (1987), Lewis (1986), Paulin and Mellor (1996), Powell and Butter￿eld (1994),
Giulano et al. (2005), Eberts and Stone (1985) and Mcdowell et al. (2001).
6and ￿rm characteristics, the gender e⁄ect in promotion and in expected promo-
tion (favoring men) is lower. In addition, there is essentially no gender di⁄erence
in wage growth with or without promotions. Other authors explicitly test the
dead-end-job hypothesis. For example, Groot et al. (1996) found that women
actually have jobs that o⁄er promotion less frequently than men. Bihagen and
Ohls (2007) in the same line, found that women and men have rather similar
levels of average wage mobility within the same jobs and that women are over-
represented in dead-end jobs. A very direct study that con￿rms the dead-end
hypothesis is Doyle et al (2004). In this research, the 2003 promotion round
at Massey University (New Zealand) is examined14. The results show that less
women than men promote to high positions. Women were somewhat less likely
than men to apply for any kind of promotion (whether within the same rank,
to a higher rank, or to obtain a new position). However, once they applied,
success rates were similar for women and men. These results are coherent with
the model we present.
3 The Benchmark Model
In this section, the main traits and results of a basic model are presented as a
benchmark to compare to a model with promotion incentives.
A ￿rm employs a continuum of workers of size one. Workers make an e⁄ort,
e which gives the ￿rm a reward given by ￿(e); where ￿0(e) > 0, ￿00(e) < 0 and
￿(0) = 0: The marginal value of e⁄ort is positive and strictly increasing with
the amount of the worker￿ s e⁄ort.
The working life of workers is divided into two periods, t = 1 and t = 2.
Period t = 1 overlaps with the child-rearing period when family responsibilities
require more e⁄ort and time. This is important because the cost of e⁄ort on
the job during this period is not the same for all workers. There are workers
that ￿nd the e⁄ort devoted to the job particularly costly in this period. More
speci￿cally, we assume that there are two types of workers, job committed and
family committed (j￿workers and f￿workers, from now on). The di⁄erence
between them is that the marginal cost of work e⁄ort (or disutility) is higher
for f￿workers than for j￿workers during the ￿rst period of their working life,
and is equal for both types during the second period. Formally, during the ￿rst





1 is the ￿rst period e⁄ort cost of





cost of the worker is unobservable to the ￿rm.




















14The patterns showed in this study were consistent with the University of Auckland study
in 2001.
7where wi
t is the type i￿ s wage in period t:
We assume that there is a ￿rm (or a coalition of ￿rms) that has monopoly
power in the labor market and does not compete for workers. We also assume
that a ￿rm o⁄ers a two-period contract, and that the workers can leave the ￿rm
at the beginning of the second period. E⁄ort and wages are both observable
and veri￿able by a third part as a court or law. We assume that the workers
and the ￿rm can commit to the terms of the contract.
The ￿rm does not observe the workers￿type when facing an applicant. This
is private information. In this context,the ￿rm designs the contracts taking into
account the probability that an individual can be job or family committed. We
assume that there are q job committed workers and (1 ￿ q) family committed,
with 0 < q < 1: Formally, the model is an adverse selection problem. We con-
sider that the ￿rm need to contract both types of workers to produce; we neglect
the possibility that the ￿rm o⁄ers the contract that only would be accepted by
the e¢ cient type, j￿worker, leaving vacant the job if the applicant is a f￿type.
We neither consider the option that a ￿rm can o⁄er di⁄erent contracts to men
and women because this do not respect antidiscrimianatory laws.
The ￿rm￿ s problem is to maximize expected pro￿ts under the constraints
that, after observing the contracts, the workers decide to accept the contract
and that each worker-type chooses the type of contract addressed to him.

































2) to the f￿type.











































































































Expressions (4) and (5), are the second period individual rationality constraints
for both types (IRi
2; i = j;f): These constraints guarantee that the worker ob-
tains at least his reservation utility, if not, the worker will quit at the beginning
of the second period. The constraints (2) and (3) are the ￿rst period individual
15See Macho-Stadler and PØrez-Castrillo (2001) or La⁄ont and Martimort (2002) for a de-
scription of adverse selection problems.
8rationality constraints for both types (IRi
1; i = j;f). These constraints mean
that if an individual does not cover his utility in the ￿rst period, he will not ac-
cept the contract. We are considering that workers have an in￿nite risk aversion
for a negative utility (punishment) in each period in the ￿rm. Risk neutrality
exists for positive payo⁄s but not for negative payo⁄s. In another context, these
are the limited liability constraints. Alternatively, it could have been assumed















but this makes it feasible for a worker to be paid a wage for example, close to zero
(w
j







1 which can not be credible in some context (bad ￿rm￿ s reputation) and/or
would require a particular discount factor and/or some non-wage income for the
workers during the ￿rst period, among other justi￿cations. (For simplicity, we
have omitted the discount factors.)Finally, the last two expressions, (6) and (7)
are the incentive compatibility constraints for each type (ICi;i = j;f): These
last two constraints (6) and (7) set that job committed workers (alternatively,
family committed workers) prefer the j-contract (alternatively, f-contract) to
the other one.
The problem can be simpli￿ed. On one hand, due to the sequential interac-
tion between the worker and the ￿rm, the solution must be calculated beginning
in the second period. In the second period, the ￿rm should guaranty the reser-
vation utility to the workers because if not, the worker will quit. Therefore,
wi
2 ￿ ei
2 = 0 since the ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts decrease with wages. The individual ratio-
nality constraints (4) and (5) for the second period holds with equality:
wi
2 ￿ ei
2 = 0;i = j;f:
In addition, as usual in problems of adverse selection, the individual rational
constraint for the e¢ cient type, IR
j
1, and the incentive compatibility constraint
for the less e¢ cient type, ICf, are redundant. See Appendix B. The ￿rm￿ s







































































The IC for the job-committed type has been rewritten to specify the informa-
tional rent, (k ￿ 1)e
f
1: This informational rent is given to the job committed
9worker to avoid him imitating the family committed type. If the ￿rst best con-
tract were o⁄ered, the j￿type would choose the f-contract and he will obtain
an utility given by (k ￿ 1)e
f
1:
It is easy to show that constraints IR
f
1 and (ICj)0 hold with equality. See
Appendix C. Hence, the optimal contracts are such that the family type covers
just the reservation utility (individual rationality holds with equality) and the
job type is indi⁄erent between choosing the contract addressed to him or the
other (incentive compatibility constraint for job type holds with equality).
Substituting constraints (9) and (10) with equality into the pro￿t function,





































￿ q(k ￿ 1)e
f
1: (13)


























less the informational rent of the job committed worker, (k ￿ 1)e
f
1: Recall that
under perfect information, the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t would be the above expression but
without the last term, (k￿1)e
f
1. See Appendix A where the model under perfect
information is solved. Hence, under asymmetric information, the ￿rm faces a
trade-o⁄ between e¢ ciency and a decrease in rents paid to j-type.
The next proposition describes the optimal contract with asymmetric infor-
mation. We index the solution with a bar.





















imized the expected pro￿t of the ￿rm, is characterized by
(i) the e⁄orts that solve:
￿0(￿ e
j
1) = 1; ￿0(￿ e
f
1) = k +
q(k￿1)
(1￿q) ;
for the ￿rst period, where ￿ e
j





2) = 1; ￿0(￿ e
f
2) = 1;
for the second, with ￿ e
j






1 = ￿ e
j




1 = k ￿ e
f
1;
for the ￿rst period, and
￿ wi
2 = ￿ ei
2;i = j;f;
for the second period.
The family committed workers cover their reservation utility, ￿ uf = 0 whereas
10job committed workers obtain a positive utility, the informational rent given by
(k ￿ 1)￿ e
f
1:
The ￿rm￿ s pro￿t is given by
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Family and job committed workers have the same wage (and e⁄ort) during
the second period, as they are identical, but during the ￿rst period the job type
gets a wage that includes the informational rent to compensate him from not
mimicking the f-type.
The features of this problem are the characteristics of an adverse selection
problem. First, the low type￿ s individual constraint (f￿type in this model)
binds. Thus, the family committed worker receives zero surplus.
Second, the high type￿ s incentive compatibility (j￿type) binds. As a result
the job committed workers obtain a positive utility, the informational rent. Firm
leaves rent to the j￿type to dissuade him from mimicking the f￿type.
Third, the high type (job committed worker) exerts the e¢ cient e⁄ort. This
is the e⁄ort that maximizes the social value of e⁄ort.
Fourth, the low type (family committed worker) exerts less than the e¢ cient
e⁄ort. This e⁄ort solves ￿0(￿ e
f
1) = k +
q(k￿1)
(1￿q) whereas under perfect information
it solves ￿0(e
￿f
1 ) = k:
Fifth, if there is a very low proportion of job committed workers, q ! 0;
there will be a small e⁄ort distortion (￿ e
f
1 tends to e
f￿
1 ) However, if there is a
high proportion of job committed workers, q ! 1; there will be a high e⁄ort
distortion and a low information rent, (k ￿ 1)￿ e
f
1:
Finally, recall that under asymmetric information the two-period contract
gives the same results as if the ￿rm had o⁄ered a one-period contract at the
beginning of each period. Contracting period by period, we will observe that
hiring workers during the ￿rst period of their working life, when there is pri-









receiving the informational rent. During the second period, the contract will
be the same as with perfect information. We choose a two-period contract for
expositional reasons.
4 Introducing Promotion Incentives
In this section we will consider that a ￿rm can promote workers. We will show
that the reason to introduce promotion incentives is that it raises pro￿ts for the
￿rm.
In this model, a promotion gives to the worker monetary and non monetary
rewards. A promotion will mean that a worker, after producing high e⁄ort for
the principal during the ￿rst period, receive a wage premium and the award of
a positional good (free from the ￿rm￿ s point of view). This could be a job title
11change (promotion from associate to full professor), granting some agents inte-
rior o¢ ces rather than open-plan desks, performing challenging tasks, holding
responsibilities, having greater work autonomy or ￿ extime, having the power
decide about who promotes and who does not, having the task of reporting on
the co-workers￿or subordinates￿job performance. Nevertheless, this positional
good is valuable because it is not given to anyone (due to being scarce) and also
because it is linked to a wage premium. The positional good does not confer
status if the attached wage is lower or equal to those of non promoted workers.
More speci￿cally, we draw the proposal of status from Besley and Ghatak
(2008). These authors introduce status incentives in a moral hazard problem.
Suppose that this good generates utility h(p) that depends on the fraction p of
workers in the organization who are awarded this positional good or, in other
words, that are promoted. If everybody is promoted, the value of the positional
good drops to zero. Moreover, positional good confers status if there is a wage





The ￿rm commits to awarding the positional good to the agent that makes









2 ) > 0
0 otherwise (16)
Thus, ￿ p = s
￿ is the fraction of workers producing high e⁄ort that can be pro-
moted, above which the value of status goes to zero. Parameters s and ￿ are
assumed to have the appropriate values to guaranty that ￿ p < 1:16
We consider that only the workers that exert high e⁄ort during the ￿rst
period have some chance of being promoted. The opposite seems unreasonable
and quite far from reality.17 The problem is solved considering that, during the
￿rst period, job committed workers make higher e⁄ort than family committed
workers.


















































16The model can be easily modi￿ed to consider that status depends on the di⁄erence between
the wage of promoted workers and non-promoted workers (as in Fershtman et al. 2006). The
results changes slightly and the implications for promotion patterns are the same.
























































































2 )+p(s￿￿p); ICf (25)
The expressions (18) and (19) are the ￿rst period individual rationality con-
straints for both types (IRi





are the second period individual rationality constraints. Note that the individ-
ual rationality constraint IRj guaranties that the expected utility of j￿workers







2 ￿ 0) to avoid that w
np
2 ! 0 which would imply that a
non promoted worker does not cover the e⁄ort cost during the second period.




2 ) > 0; is necessary as promotion must be
linked to a wage increase if not promotion does not confer status. Finally, the
last two expressions are the incentive compatibility constraints for each type
(ICi;i = j;f): These two constraints set that job committed workers (alterna-
tively, family committed workers) choose the contract addressed to them.
There are several di⁄erences with respect to the basic model in the previous





2 ): Conversely, status incentives does not appear in the
pro￿t function as they are free from the ￿rm￿ s point of view. Secondly, the
individual rationality constraints of the worker that exerts high e⁄ort includes
promotion incentives (monetary and social rewards), see (22). Thirdly, the
incentive compatibility constraints also are di⁄erent. It is interesting to note





p(s ￿ ￿p); relax the j￿worker￿ s incentive compatibility constraint, ICj:
The ￿rm￿ s problem can be simpli￿ed. See Appendix D. Inserting some con-
straints that hold with equality into the principal￿ s objective function, it yields
a program that depends on the e⁄orts, the promotion probability and the wage










































































1 ￿ p(s ￿ ￿p)
i
￿ 0 (ICj)00 (29)




2 ): From the constraint




2 ) ￿ (k￿1)e
f




























2 ) by some
amount and increase pro￿ts. Thus (28) holds with equality. Recall that the IC
of the job-committed type is di⁄erent from the benchmark. In this new context,
the ￿rm should give to the j-type an informational rent which is lower when
promotion incentives are introduced. In expression (28), it can be seen that the
expected wages less the e⁄ort during the two periods are equal to the informa-
tional rent of the previous section less the value of status, that is, it must be
equal to (k ￿ 1)e
f
1 ￿ p(s ￿ ￿p):
Substituting expression (28) into the objective function and after some sim-
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= (k ￿ 1)e
f
1 ￿ p(s ￿ ￿p)
The solution is described in the next proposition.
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promotion incentives is characterized by
(i) the e⁄orts that solve :
￿0(^ e
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1) = 1; ￿0(^ e
f
1) = k +
q(k￿1)
(1￿q) ;
for the ￿rst period, with ^ e
j





2) = ￿0(^ e
f
2) = 1;
14for the second period, with ^ e
j

















2; i = j;f
for family committed workers and job committed that not promote, and the wages
for promoted workers ( ^ w
j
1 ; ^ w
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= (k ￿ 1)^ e
f
1 ￿ ^ p(s ￿ ￿^ p) (30)
^ w
p
2 ￿ ^ e
j
2 > 0 (31)
^ w
j
1 ￿ ^ e
j
1 ￿ 0 (32)





where ^ p = s
2￿ < s
￿ = ￿ p:
The family committed workers cover their reservation utility and the expected
utility of the job committed type is positive, it equals the informational rent:
^ uf = 0
^ uj = (k ￿ 1)^ e
f
1:
The ￿rm￿ s pro￿t is given by
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j
1 + ￿(^ e
j








2) ￿ ^ e
f
1 + ￿(^ e
f







(k ￿ 1)^ e
f
1 ￿ ^ p[s ￿ ￿ ^ p]
i
(33)
The optimal contract with promotion incentives shows that the e⁄ort are
the same as the benchmark, therefore, the introduction of promotion incentives
does not lead to any distortion of e⁄orts. The wages are di⁄erent. Particularly,
the ￿rm has a combination of wages ( ^ w
j
1 ; ^ w
p
2) that solve the problem. There is







< 1: the ￿rm faces a trade-o⁄ between
paying more to the e¢ cient worker during the ￿rst period or during the second.
In any case, in equilibrium (i) both wages cover at least the e⁄ort, which is the
same in the two periods; (ii) the wage after promotion is higher than the wage
of non-promoted workers, and (iii) the expected pecuniary and non-pecuniary
rewards equal the informational rent of the job-committed workers.
Recall that if we assume that during the ￿rst period the wage equal the cost
of e⁄ort (i.e., expression (31) holds with equality), then we obtain that
w
p








1 ￿ p(s ￿ ￿p)
i
:
15Under this assumption, the informational rent will be paid as a higher wage
premium. This situation produces the largest gap between promoted and non-
promoted worker wages.
The fact that there is combination of equilibrium wages can be viewed as
a undesirable result of the model. However, we think that this result can also
be considered a good approximation to reality. It simply implies that ￿rms can
give the informational rent (to the job-committed worker that exerts a high level
of e⁄ort) during the ￿rst or the second period. And empirically we ￿nd that
there is not always a huge increase in wages for promoted workers. There exists
a diversity of wage increases after promotion, all of which are optimal from the
￿rm￿ s point of view.
The wages for promoted people decreases with the possibilities of promotion,
ceteris paribus. The higher the probability of promotion, the lower the status
payo⁄ and the higher the monetary payo⁄ must be.
Notice that ex-post, unlike the model without promotion, there is a di⁄er-
ence between j￿workers. Those that are promoted obtain higher utility than
informational rent, while non-promoted workers just cover reservation utility.
The e⁄ects of introducing promotion incentives
The introduction of promotion incentives do not change the optimal e⁄orts
of the basic problem of adverse selection, the changes comes from wages paid to
job committed workers.
Lemma 3 The e⁄ort levels do not change if the ￿rm introduces promotion in-
centives









= k ^ e
f











1 = ^ ei
2;
Lemma 5 The wages for job committed workers are di⁄erent with promotion
incentives. More speci￿cally, in the model with promotion incentives they earn
less during the ￿rst period:
￿ w
j
1 = ￿ e
j











1 > ^ w
j




1 < (k￿1)^ e
f
1 as (29) is veri￿ed.
whereas, during the second period, they have the chance of getting higher wages































16The wages of job committed workers change if the ￿rm introduces promo-
tion incentives. The ￿rm knows that to avoid job committed workers mimicking
the family committed workers, the former should be led by a positive utility,
an informational rent (k ￿ 1)￿ e
f
1: In this context, ￿rms ￿nd that they can give
this informational rent as monetary or non-monetary rewards. Job committed
workers are status concerned and status is free from the ￿rm￿ s point of view.
Hence, ￿rms elicit high e⁄ort -from job committed types- during the ￿rst period
with the wage of this period and also with the commitment of a potential pro-
motion. During the second period any worker will obtain at least the wage that
covers the cost of e⁄ort in this period. Speci￿cally, the ￿rm reduces the wage in
the ￿rst period and increases the expected wage for the second. Altogether, it
makes the expected utility for the worker is the same with both contracts. But
those that are actually promoted will obtain a higher second period wage than
in the model without promotion and those that are not promoted cover just the
utility in this second period. Ex ante, both types of workers obtain the same
utility under the two types of contracts.
More important is the comparison of pro￿ts. Firms take advantage of the
introduction of promotion possibilities. The ￿rm can elicit a given level of e⁄ort
at lower wages if he the status concern is internalized.
Proposition 6 The introduction of promotion possibilities increases the pro￿ts
for the ￿rm.
Proof. The pro￿t without promotion is
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and with promotion possibilities is
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(k ￿ 1)^ e
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1 ￿ ^ p[s ￿ ￿ ^ p]
i
In route to contradiction, let us consider that ￿ ￿ > ^ ￿ and eliminating all the
values that are equal, it yields that ^ p[s ￿ ￿ ^ p] < 0 which contradicts the as-
sumption of the model, the value of status is non-negative. Then ^ ￿ > ￿ ￿; the
pro￿ts with promotion incentives are higher.
Firms take advantage of the possibility of reducing the monetary incentives
to elicit a given level of e⁄ort, compensating the job committed workers with a
combination of monetary and status rewards after promotion.
5 Implications for gender di⁄erences in promo-
tion rates
This framework will allow us to consider why promotion rates di⁄er across
gender. Let us assume that there are more family committed workers among
17women than among men. The introduction exposed some reasons to consider
this as a reasonable re￿ ection of biological evolution or social features.
The ￿rm o⁄ers a contract menu to screen among the workers. Workers self-
select according to a rational choice based on their preferences. Workers can
choose two types of contracts. One is addressed to job committed workers and
o⁄ers promotion possibilities. The other one is addressed to family-committed
workers and does not o⁄er such possibilities. Consider, by a moment, that all
men are job committed. Then, due to the lower cost of men￿ s e⁄ort during
the ￿rst period (child rearing period) compared to women, they choose the








2;^ p) that sets a high level of e⁄ort during the ￿rst period
but o⁄er promotion possibilities. However, among women there are also family









that does not o⁄er promotion possibilities and sets a lower level of e⁄ort during
the child rearing period (￿rst period). After this period, all workers have the
same e⁄ort cost, but promotion has already been decided. Hence, if we compare,
on average, the promotion rate of women will be lower than the rate for men.
Therefore, two interesting results comes from the model.
Corollary 7 If there are more family-committed workers among women than
among men, women on average are promoted less frequently because more women
than men are in jobs that do not o⁄er opportunities for promotion.
Recall that those women that have job committed preferences will choose the
contract addressed to j￿type, that is, the contract with promotion possibilities.
Hence, they have a probability ^ p of being promoted which is the same as the
probability for job committed men. What is more, the wage after promotion
will be the same as both types choose the same contract.
Corollary 8 If women and men are both in jobs that o⁄er promotion opportu-
nities, then women have the same chance of actually being promoted as men.
Corollary 9 The wage premium after promotion is the same for men and
women.
6 Conclusions
Despite of the voluminous literature on gender di⁄erences in the labour market,
there are few theoretical models on gender di⁄erences in promotion patterns.
The model that we have presented argues that di⁄erent gender promotion pat-
terns might arise from a rational choice of men and women according to their
preferences.
As usual in the literature on gender di⁄erences, this paper relies on di⁄erent
attitudes towards household and family care. The distribution of preferences
among the women population is di⁄erent from that of men. More women than
men have a traditional role, and family-committed preferences are more ex-
tended among the women population. (On the contrary, the job-committed
preferences are more extended among the male population.)
18Preferences are private information, so ￿rms need to screen among the work-
ers as they do not know the degree of commitment of a particular applicant.
Thus, ￿rms face an adverse selection problem. In this context, we show that
￿rms make higher pro￿ts if they introduce the possibility of promotion in the
contracts. "The possibility of promotion is a major component of non-pecuniary
rewards of a job contributing to motivation and work incentive", (Winter-Ebmer
and Zweimuller, 1997, p.44). In particular, the ￿rms o⁄er two types of contracts,
one with promotion possibilities and other without such possibilities. The re-
sults show that more women than men choose the later. The reason is that the
contract without promotion incentives set a lower e⁄ort on the job during the
￿rst period in the ￿rm, when child care requires more e⁄ort and time. After-
wards, during the second period, although the cost of e⁄ort on the job is the
same for everybody, the decision on promotion has been made. Accordingly, as
women are less frequently in jobs that o⁄er promotion possibilities than men,
the promotion rates of women, on average, are lower. However, and this is an
interesting feature of the model, we show that when women occupy the same
jobs as men, that is, a job with promotion possibilities, they have also the same
promotion chance and the same wage premium after promotion.
In the extent that preferences for market work evolve among women popu-
lation toward job-committed preferences, we could observe a reduction in the
promotion gap. Additionally, the change in ￿rms policy could reinforce the
change in women preferences. This could contribute to explain the profound
transformation in the role that women play in the family and in the workplace.
Most theoretical models rely on discriminatory practices: di⁄erences in
promotions arise because ￿rms discriminate against women because prejudice
(Lazear and Rosen, 1990; Booth et al., 2003) or taste for discrimination (Mil-
gron and Oster, 1987). Our paper contributes to the permanent debate about
if gender di⁄erences in labour market outcomes are due to discrimination or to
other unobservable factors which included di⁄erences in preferences. We do not
reject the presence of any type of gender discrimination in the labour market,
in fact it might be a complementary explanation to justify the di⁄erence in
promotion patterns by gender.
The predictions of our model can be evaluated in the light of the existing
empirical literature. As we have exposed in the introduction, we ￿nd empirical
con￿rmation of these proposition. First, women, on average, will be less present
in higher job levels relative to men and will have lower wages. The empirical
literature in support of this prediction is substantial. Our theory also predicts
that women are just as likely as men to be promoted in the same type of jobs
.Empirical con￿rmation of this proposition is more di¢ cult to ￿nd since, usu-
ally, data on possibilities of promotion on-the-jobs is not available. When this
information exists, evidence supports our prediction. Our third testable predic-
tion is that promoted women gain the same wages as men. Again, empirical
literature is substantial.
19Appendix A: The ￿rms￿problem under perfect information
If there were not an adverse selection problem and the principal faced to a
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j
2 (34c)
where (33b) and (33c) are the individual rationality constraints of job committed





Due to the sequential interaction between the worker and the ￿rm, the solu-
tion must be calculated at beginning of the second period. In the second period,
the ￿rm will pay just to cover the reservation utility of the worker. Suppose
instead that the ￿rms pays more wi
2 ￿ ei





by some amount and increase ￿rm pro￿t. Therefore, the wage in the second




2 = 0: This reasoning can also





1 = 0: Taking into account these values for wages and substituting
















and the optimal e⁄ort values are given by
￿0(e
j￿
1 ) = 1
￿0(e
j￿
2 ) = 1
We index the optimal value contracts under perfect information with an asterisk.










Similarly, if a ￿rm faces a family committed worker, the optimal contract
will be characterized by
￿0(e
f￿
1 ) = k (7)
￿0(e
f￿
2 ) = 1 (8)









Taking into account that ￿00(e) < 0; it is easy to see that, in the ￿rst period,







and their wage can be higher or lower depending on the value of the parameters.
Therefore, each type covers his reservation utility ui￿
1 + ui￿
2 = 0; i = j;f:
The characteristics of the ￿rst best contract menu are the following.





















der perfect information, is characterized by
(i)the e⁄ort levels that solve:
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for the ￿rst period, and
wi
2 = ei￿
2 ; i = j;f:
for the second period.
Each type covers his reservation utility ui￿
1 + ui￿
2 = 0; i = j;f:
Appendix B
￿ The individual rational constraint for the e¢ cient type IR
j
1 is redundant.
Note that if the incentive compatibility of the job type (ICj) and the
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1 ￿ 0, so that the IR
j
1 is ful￿lled.
￿ The incentive compatibility constraint of the family type ICf is redun-




















































1 since k > 1: From the above inequality
we have that if the ICj (r.h.s) holds, the ICf also holds (l.h.s.) since
k > 1: We can neglect the ICf:
Appendix C
21￿ The individual rationality constraint of the family type IRf holds with
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1 by some amount without violating the incen-
tive compatibility constraint (ICj)0 and increase pro￿t.
￿ The incentive compatibility constraint of the job type (ICj)0 holds with






















We could decrease w
j
1 without violating any constraint and increase ￿rm
pro￿t.
Appendix D




2 for the second period
holds with equality. In the second period, the ￿rm guaranties the reser-
vation utility to the workers because if not, the worker will quit. If wages
are higher than the second period cost of e⁄ort, the ￿rm pro￿ts can raise
reducing wages.
￿ The individual rational constraint for the e¢ cient type IRj is redundant.
Note that if the incentive compatibility of the job type (ICj) and the
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2 ) ￿ 0, so that the IRj is ful￿lled.
￿ The ICf of the less e¢ cient, f￿type, is redundant. Considering that the
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And if the second inequality holds with equality, the ￿rst will be ful￿lled




1: Thus, the second one, the ICj;
is operative. Therefore, the constraint ICf can be eliminated from the
maximization problem.
￿ The individual rationality constraint of the family type (IRf) holds with




1 > 0: Then taking into account






















1 by some amount without violating the incen-
tive compatibility constraint (ICj) and increase pro￿t.
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